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A R T I C L E
Corporate Governance and the
Protection of Stakeholder Interests
in British Banks
R O M A N T O M A S I C , P R O F E S S O R O F D U R H A M U N I V E R S I T Y , U N I T E D K I N G D O M 
1. INTRODUCTION
The corporate governance of British banks has received considerable
attention in recent years from a succession of government inquiries,
media reports and academic studies. It is clear that during the global
financial crisis banks failed to adequately protect their stakeholders
and that some suffered dearly as a result. This calls for more effective
mechanisms and new thinking on the protection of these diverse
stakeholder interest groups, whether they be shareholders, deposi-
tors, employees, other banks supplying credit, or the wider com-
munity. A system of networked corporate governance is called for
with links between the internal corporate governance arrangements
in banks and external regulatory structures, as well as to market
mechanism and gatekeepers that need to be energized to operate
more effectively as controllers. In this regard, banks may serve as a
model for other larger companies as many large companies share
many features that are similar to those of banks.
The corporate governance literature identifies a broad range of
stakeholders in companies. These interests or stakeholders may be
divided between those that are internal to the company and those
that are external to it, although the degree of engagement with
external stakeholders may be such that their interests can be equally
important to the success of the company as the interests of internal
stakeholders. This is especially so in regard to banks that are often
seen as playing a key role in maintaining the wider market economy
and transactions within this market through the supply of credit. My
focus in this paper will be upon public limited companies in the
United Kingdom and not upon private companies. I will be looking
particularly at the corporate governance arrangements within banks
and the manner in which stakeholder interests are balanced within
these types of companies.
Internal stakeholders include the company’s shareholders, its
employees, and its creditors. The company’s suppliers of goods and
services can also be classified as creditors in some situations, although
they might be seen as external stakeholders. In the case of banks,
external stakeholders also include a company’s customer who plays a
critical role in regard to the success of the company. Bank depositors
are also important stakeholders, even though they might otherwise be
seen as customers. Similarly, other banks can be important stake-
holders, as they provide short-term liquidity to keep banks opera-
tional. These other banks may be competitors in one sense, but it is
clear that competitors may also be seen as a kind of stakeholder.
More broadly, stakeholders also include the government and the
community within which the company operates; this effectively
means that the governmental regulatory agencies may potentially play
an important stakeholder role in many larger companies (such as
through industry licensing and the imposition of various regulatory
requirements in areas such as health and safety and environmental
matters). In the case of banks, the role of government as a stakeholder
is especially important.
In regard to banks and financial institutions in the United King-
dom, the provision and removal of banking licenses1 and the
approval of persons as being fit and proper persons to sit on a bank’s
board of directors is an illustration of the power of these external
stakeholders. The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) has broad
powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (United
Kingdom) over both regulated and unregulated firms and individuals
who fail to comply with prescribed market rules.2 These enforcement
powers were recently extended by the Financial Services Act 2010
(United Kingdom), which now empowers the FSA to suspend or
restrict authorized and approved persons; persons who conduct
controlled functions in the financial sector without appropriate
governmental approval may also suffer the imposition of penalties.
This paper explores how stakeholder ideas can be applied to a
discussion of the corporate governance of banks and suggests that a
much broader range of stakeholders need to be considered when
 E-mail: r.a.tomasic@durham.ac.uk. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Co-Reach ‘Stakeholders and Gatekeepers in Corporate Governance’ Workshop held at the
Law Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 14–15 May 2011. Funding from the British Academy for the UK part of this project is gratefully acknowledged.
1 The provision of new banking licenses is relatively rare in the United Kingdom, with the first new bank license in over 100 years being granted recently to the new Metro Bank; see
further, H. Wallop, ‘Metro Bank Granted FSA Licence’, The Telegraph, 5 Mar. 2010.
2 See generally, Financial Services Authority, ‘FSA Enforcement Information Guide’, October 2010.
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thinking about bank governance. This inevitably takes us beyond the
narrower range of stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and employees)
that tend to dominate discussions of corporate governance in other
types of companies. However, banks are important in the develop-
ment of stakeholder ideas, as they illustrate that we need to go
beyond the narrow principal agency model of the corporation that
has dominated corporate governance discussions.
More recent thinking about corporate governance has stressed
the importance of going beyond these narrow confines and adopting
a more networked approach to governance in a knowledge economy,
which are captured in phrases such as ‘network governance’ and
‘network regulation’.3 The power of this wider network model of
stakeholderism is especially apparent in regard to banks and is best
captured in the idea of ‘contagion’ that is often used in discussing the
effects of the instability of one bank upon other banks. It may,
however, be useful at this stage to review the development of stake-
holder ideas in relation to the governance of corporations.
2. THE EMERGENCE OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY
The emergence of stakeholder theory has been a major feature of the
business management literature of the last three decades, although
the term can be traced back at least to a 1963 internal memorandum
at the Stanford Research Institute, which defined stakeholders as
‘those groups without whose support the organization would cease
to exist’.4 In 1983, the management theorist R Edward Freeman
published his influential text, ‘Strategic Management – A Stake-
holder Approach’, which built upon earlier studies in this area.5
There is now a voluminous literature dealing with stakeholder
management in the modern corporation, but it is beyond the scope
of this paper to review this here.6
As we have seen, Freeman defined stakeholders as ‘[a]ny group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
firm’s objectives’.7 Freeman’s list of such stakeholders included the
following: owners, employees, suppliers, customers, competitors,
consumer advocates, media, environmentalists, local community
organizations and governments. Freeman noted that:
Each of these groups plays a vital role in the success of the business
enterprise in today’s environment. Each of these groups has a
stake in the modern corporation, hence, the term ‘stakeholder’,
and ‘the stakeholder model or framework’ or ‘stakeholder
management’.8
We could add further groups, such as depositors and competitor
banks, when discussing bank stakeholders. Freeman noted that this
reality called for new theories or models of how each of these groups
work so as to develop a strategy for each group; he added that there
was also the need to develop integrated approaches for dealing with
these multiple stakeholder groups of the corporation. As he
explained, there was a need to consider how each strategic issue
affected these stakeholders, creating the need for ‘processes which
help take into account the concerns of many groups’.9 Freeman and
McVea subsequently noted that:
A stakeholder approach emphasizes the importance of investing in
the relationships with those who have a stake in the firm. The
stability of these relationships depends on the sharing of, at least, a
core of principles or values.
This was seen as important, as the long-term survival of the firm
depended upon a shared set of values, on the one hand, of the
corporation and of its managers and, on the other hand, the values of
its various stakeholders.10 Empirical evidence of the link between a set
of core values in the company and the long-term success or survival
of the company has been identified by a number of other
researchers.11
This is especially clear when we come to discuss bank governance
where a failure to consider wider stakeholder interests in the pursuit
of short-term gains (e.g., bonuses) by those controlling banks can
undermine the survival of the bank and may trigger wider external
intervention in the affairs of banks. In reviewing the rise of what he
refers to as ‘the stakeholder corporation’, Clarke has noted that:
Though ascendant in financial circles the shareholder view of the
firm has only occasionally enjoyed a strong voluntary commitment
3 See generally in regard to network regulation, J.B. Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008); also see S.
Turnbull, ‘Network Governance’, Corporate Governance International 6, no. 3 (2003): 4–14; and C. Jones, W.S. Hesterly & S.P. Borgatti, ‘A General Theory of Network Governance:
Exchange, Conditions and Social Mechanisms’, Academy of Management Journal 22, no. 4 (1997): 911–945.
4 Referred to by Freeman in R.E. Freeman, A Strategic Management – A Stakeholder Approach (University of Minnesota, 1984), Cambridge University Press (reprint), at 31–32.
5 Ibid., 33–44. Freeman has noted that elements of the stakeholder concept were also developed in the corporate planning literature of the 1960s and in the systems theory literature
of the 1970s; the 1980s saw the corporate social responsibility literature build upon the original Stanford Research Institute stakeholder concept by applying the concept to groups
who had previously been seen to be in an adversarial relationship with the firm. It might also be noted that organizational theorists from the 1960s also began to look at stakeholder
issues, such as the interaction between the organization and the wider environment, which was reflected in the work of William Evan dealing with the notion of the ‘organization
set’.
6 See further, A.L. Friedman & S. Miles, Stakeholders – Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); A.J. Zakhem, D.E. Palmer & M.L. Stoll (eds), Stakeholder Theory
(New York: Prometheus Books, 2008); and R.A. Phillips & R.E. Freeman (eds), Stakeholders (Abingdon: Edward Elgar, 2010). Also see T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston, ‘The
Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and Implications’, The Academy of Management Review 20, no. 1 (1995): 65–91.
7 Freeman, 25.
8 Ibid., 25.
9 Ibid., 26.
10 See further, R.E. Freeman & J. McVea, ‘A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management’, in Handbook on Strategic Management, ed. M.A. Hitt, R.E. Freeman & J.S. Harrison
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 189–207, at 195–196.
11 See further, J. Collins & J. Porras, Built to Last (New York: Harper, 1994); and A. Svendsen, The Stakeholder Strategy (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Inc., 1998).
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from industrial managers who have to wrestle with the more
practical concerns of running a business. In practice, executives
leading companies and managers operating them have increas-
ingly utilised elements of the stakeholder approach. The defence
of shareholder rights sits uneasily with how increasingly compa-
nies are managed.12
These practical limitations of the shareholder value concept were
illustrated a few years ago by an observation by Jack Welch, the
former CEO of one of America’s most admired companies, General
Electrics, who observed in 2009 that a focus merely upon a com-
pany’s quarterly financial returns was ‘the dumbest idea in the
world’.13 This was because, as Welch argued, ‘[s]hareholder value is a
result, not a strategy’ and that a company’s main constituencies
should be seen as its employees, customers and its products.14
However, the company or corporate law literature (whether
scholarly or judicial) has been slow to embrace stakeholder theory,
although American constituency statutes show a limited movement
in this direction.15 Traditionally, the so-called shareholder primacy
doctrine prevailed and arguably required that directors seek to
maximize the wealth of their members as a whole when making
corporate decisions.16 Thus, the courts have prohibited directors
from providing benefits to employees or the community unless this
is clearly being done for the benefit of the shareholders.17
This was because shareholders had contributed capital and had a
residual entitlement to the remaining assets in the event of the
company’s insolvency. However, governments have increasingly
imposed additional layers of monitoring and control in regard to
some major corporations, such as banks and insurance companies
because of the wider impact that their failure may cause.
Traditional agency theory saw directors as being the agents of the
shareholders (although in law they, strictly speaking, were not; this
was because directors only had a legal obligation to the company as a
whole). Corporate governance arrangements were intended to
minimize agency costs and sought to align the interests of managers
with those of shareholders. These agency costs referred to the
dangers of directors engaging in shirking behaviour or in self-serving
behaviour (such as the diversion of corporate opportunities from the
company) at the expense of shareholders.
The provision of adequate remuneration and incentives for
management was seen as a way of maximizing benefits for share-
holders. This has become a particular public concern in regard to the
governance of banks and financial institutions, although we are yet to
find an adequate solution to it. Interestingly, shareholders of banks
have been prepared to see their senior officers and leading investment
managers being very well rewarded financially for their efforts,
despite the poor long-term performance of their actions.
The justifications for a narrow shareholder wealth maximization
approach (adopted by many corporate law scholars) can be traced
back to contractual models of the firm, which has been conceptua-
lized as a nexus of contracts; this model has been built upon the work
of economists such as Ronald Coase; the firm was seen as a means of
minimizing the transaction costs of the business;18 this model
assumed that shareholders (and others within the firm) entered into
contracts, such as employment contracts with managers aimed at
providing managers with sufficient incentives so as to maximize
returns for shareholders. However, as the economic concept of the
firm was always a broader idea than the legal conception of the
company, it was not unusual for economists and lawyers to reach
different conclusions in this area.
Leading proponents of this value maximization model of the
corporation, such as the economist Michael C Jensen, have been
critical of stakeholder theory as playing ‘into the hands of special
interests that wish to use the resources of the corporation for their
own ends’.19 However, and somewhat unexpectedly, the recent global
financial crisis has focused critical attention on the dangers of short
termism (inherent in shareholder wealth maximization strategies)
and has prompted governments and multi-lateral bodies to call for
the adoption of longer-term business perspectives in corporations.20
The debate about executive remuneration has continued in the
guise of calls for shareholders in listed companies to be given a greater
say over the pay of directors and senior managers. This debate has
12 T. Clarke, ‘The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the Information Age’, in Theories of Corporate Governance, ed. T Clarke (London: Routledge, 2004), 189–201,
at 190. Quoting Plender, Clarke (at 200) suggests that: ‘a stakeholder approach may be not just a moral imperative, but a commercial necessity ‘‘in a world where competitive
advantage stemmed more and more from the intangible values embodied in human and social capital’’’.
13 Quoted by F. Guerren, ‘A Need to Reconnect’, in The Financial Times supplement The Future of Capitalism (ed. L Barber), 12 May 2009, 33.
14 Ibid., 33.
15 See further, A.R. Keay, ‘Moving towards Stakeholderism? Enlightened Shareholder Value, Constituency Statutes and More: Much Ado About Little?’, European Business Law
Review 9 (2011): 1–49.
16 However, the narrow shareholder primacy doctrine is not without its critics and is arguably not as narrow as its proponents suggest; see further, L.A. Stout, ‘New Thinking in
‘‘Shareholder Primacy’’’, UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 11-04, <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1763944>. Also see A.R. Keay, ‘Stakeholder Theory in Corporate
Law: Has It Got What It Takes?’, Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business 9 (2010): 249.
17 The classic cases on this are Hutton v. West Cork Rly Co (1883) 39 Ch D 156 and Parke v. Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927. Also see generally L. Sealy, ‘Directors’ ‘‘Wider’’
Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural’, Monash University Law Review 13 (1987): 164.
18 Ronald Coase’s influential essays on the nature of the firm are to be found (at 18–74) in O.E. Williamson & S.G. Winter (ed.), The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution and
Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Also see O.E. Williamson & S.E. Masten (eds), The Economics of Transaction Costs (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd, 1999); and F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
19 M.C. Jensen, ‘Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function’, in US Corporate Governance, ed. D.H. Chew & S.L. Gillan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009), 3–25, at 22. Also see generally, J. Argenti, ‘Stakeholders: The Case Against’, Long Range Planning 30, no. 3 (1997): 442; and A. Campbell, ‘Stakeholders: The
Case in Favour’, Long Range Planning 30, no. 3 (1997): 446.
20 Government concerns about the need for greater long-term strategies in UK companies have been reflected in a number of recent public consultations in the United Kingdom.
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been linked to repeated calls to demonstrate that the payment of
executive remuneration can be explained by improved longer-term
performance of their companies. UK Business Secretary Vince Cable
has, for some time, been calling for action to limit excessive executive
salaries in banks and other enterprises.21 Too often, companies such
as investment banks have rewarded short-term achievement (such as
the selling of poor quality securities) without regard to the long-term
value of the securities or products that they traded.
This has been seen recently in the United Kingdom with the mis-
selling scandal, which saw banks sell billions of pounds of payment
protection insurance (PPI) to their borrowers, even though these
borrowers were not in the position to claim on these insurance
policies. Those writing bank loans to mortgage customers would
receive commissions for selling PPI policies, even though these bor-
rowers were unaware of having been sold this additional product.22
This is reminiscent of banks selling AAA-rated securitized products to
investors, even though the quality of assets that have been brought
together in these securities was actually quite poor.23 It also reminds
us of the way in which investment banks such as Goldman Sachs have
put together portfolios (credit default obligations (CDOs)) for sale to
their banking clients, only to then bet against their clients that these
CDOs would fail.24 Prior to the recent financial crisis, banks rewarded
their staff for writing massive sub-prime loans such that many of
these banks then carried massive toxic loans; in one recent report, the
Bank of America reported that it was carrying some USD 850 billion
in bad loans of this kind and that it was actively seeking to reduce this
burden for the sake of its own survival.25
As part of the bargain that was said to serve as the foundation of
the agency model of the corporation, directors are given control
over decision making in regard to the management of the company,
with shareholders being given a reduced number of levers of power,
such as the power to appoint or dismiss directors, as well as the
right to receive information to evaluate company performance, such
as in the company accounts.26 Increasingly, we have seen calls for
shareholders to be given broader powers to express their views on
remuneration packages and major company transactions, such as the
disposal of key assets.
Shareholders have also been given more streamlined (although
often ineffective) powers to take action against directors in the name
of the company where the directors have breached their duties to the
company (derivative suits);27 shareholder also retain the legal power
to enforce the terms of the company constitution where this has been
breached by another shareholder or by the company.
But because directors do not normally have a duty to shareholders,
it is difficult for shareholders in their own right to take action against
bank directors for breaching their duties. Collective action problems
have meant that shareholders in large widely dispersed shareholder
companies often are unable to act in a synchronized way to initiate
some forms of shareholder action. The Northern Rock shareholder
action seemed to be something of an aberration, as this was brought
against the UK government and not against the bank’s directors.28
Moreover, problems of information asymmetry make it difficult
for shareholders to have sufficient information about the company to
be able to call directors to account even if they can achieve the
necessary majorities to exercise their legal powers. This even applies to
larger institutional shareholders who are generally passive in regard to
corporate governance issues. The recently promulgated Stewardship
Code in the United Kingdom aims to encourage institutional share-
holder to be more activist, but this remains problematic.29
Some concession to the shareholder primacy model has been
made in the recognition of other interests in the company, but largely
as a result of statutory intervention; this has usually arisen in insol-
vency or impending insolvency situations and applies especially to
the interests of employees and creditors. It was considered that once a
company is nearing insolvency, the unsecured assets of the company
should first be available to satisfy claims by creditors and employees
and that directors should manage the company having regard to their
interests.30 Also, in a company takeover context, directors are often
21 See further V. Cable, ‘Call the Bankers’ Bluff’, New Statesman (20 Feb. 2009); More recently, Cable has foreshadowed new legislation in this area; see further ‘UK could legislate to
curb excessive pay – Cable’, Reuters, 14 Nov. 2011, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/uk-britain-cable-idUKTRE7AD02F20111114>.
22 See further J. Treanor & G. Wearden, ‘FSA Tells Banks to Speed Up PPI Compensation’, The Guardian 10 May 2011, at 22.
23 See generally G. Tett, Fool’s Gold: How Unrestrained Greed Corrupted a Dream, Shattered Global Markets and Unleashed a Catastrophe (London: Little Brown, 2009). Also see
P. Augar, Chasing Alpha: How Reckless Growth and Unchecked Ambition Ruined the City’s Golden Decade (London: Bodley Head, 2009); and P. Augar, The Greed Merchants: How
the Investment Banks Played the Free Market Game (London: Penguin Books, 2006).
24 This lead to a US Securities and Exchange Commission action being brought Goldman Sachs (ultimately being settled by the imposition of a heavy fine); see further Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Goldman Sachs & Co and Fabrice Tourre 10 Civ. 3229 (BJ) (S.D.N.Y April 16, 2010). Also see C. Harper & R. Schmidt, ‘Goldman Deserves Regulatory Probe,
Bloomberg Poll Says’, Bloomberg 8 Jun. 8 2010, <www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-07/goldman-sachs-deserves-scrutiny-by-regulators-in-bloomberg-subscriber-poll.html>.
25 See further S. Kapner & J. Baer, ‘BofA Plans to Halve Its $850 bn in Bad Loans’, The Financial Times, 10 May 2011, at 22.
26 See further A. Keay, Directors’ Duties (Bristol: Jordan Publishing, 2008).
27 See generally A. Reisberg, ‘Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado About Nothing?’, in Rationality in Common Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice, ed. J.
Armour & J. Payne (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 17–55; A.R. Keay & J.M. Loughrey, ‘Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: An Analysis of the New
Derivative Action under the Companies Act 2006’, The Law Quarterly Review (2008): 469.
28 See further R. Tomasic, ‘Shareholder Litigation and the Financial Crisis: The Northern Rock Shareholder Appeal Considered’, Company Law Newsletter 262 (29 Oct. 2009): 1–5.
29 See generally B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel’, Modern Law Review 73 (2010): 1004–1025; A. Reisberg, ‘The Notion of Stewardship from a Company Law
Perspective: Re-defined and Re-assessed in Light of the Recent Financial Crisis?’, Journal of Financial Crime 18, no. 2 (2011): 126–147; L. Roach, ‘The UK Stewardship Code’,
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 463–493.
30 See generally J.S. Ziegel, ‘Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders – The Quiet Revolution – An Anglo-Canadian Perspective’, University of Toronto Law Journal 43 (1993): 511; A.R.
Keay, ‘Formulating a Framework for Directors’ Duties to Creditors: An Entity Maximization Approach’, The Cambridge Law Journal 64 (2005): 614; and A.R. Keay, ‘Directors’
Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-protection of Creditors’, The Modern Law Review 66 (2003): 665.
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said to have a broader responsibility than merely serving the wealth
maximization interest of the current shareholders.31 This is pre-
sumably even more so in regard to more complex institutions, like
banks, due to the systemic importance attributed to them.
An increasing body of progressive legal scholars has challenged
the narrow economic thinking behind the shareholder primacy
model and has called for a broadening of legal thinking about the use
of stakeholder ideas. Probably the most influential of these writings
have been those of writers such as Blair and Stout who have advo-
cated the ‘team production’ model of the corporation in which the
board was seen as a mediating hierarchy between diverse groups of
stakeholders within the corporation.32 This ‘new’ thinking33 has
influenced recent company law reforms in the United Kingdom, as
will be discussed below. Banks themselves have been subject to
unprecedented scrutiny in recent times, leading to more onerous
expectations being expected of the backgrounds and experience of
directors, as evidenced in the findings of the Walker review into
directors of UK banks and financial institutions.34 The Final Report
of the UK Independent Commission on Banking (the Vickers
Commission) has also recommended ‘ring fencing’ the normal uti-
lity side of banking so as to protect it from the riskier investment
banking operations of banks.35 However, debate continues over the
introduction of these reforms with the UK government having
proposed to postpone this until 2019, whilst critics argue that this
should not be delayed for more than two years.36
3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STAKEHOLDER LAW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM
In 2006, the United Kingdom enacted a new Companies Act, which
is notable for a number of major company law reforms. One of these
was the attempt to displace the idea of shareholder wealth maximi-
zation with the new concept of ‘enlightened shareholder value’. This
new idea sought to encourage directors when making decisions to
have regard for the long-term success of the company. In doing so, it
sought to impose a legal obligation upon directors to have regard to
the interests of a number of other company stakeholders.
This intention was expressed in the form of section 172(1) of the
UK Companies Act, which provides that:
172 Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers,
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole,
and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to –
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long
term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships
with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the com-
munity and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company’s maintaining a repu-
tation for high standards of business conduct, and
(f ) the need to act fairly between members of the
company.
This is not an exhaustive list of interests. Section 172(3) preserves
the position of creditors and provides that section 172(1) is to be read
as being subject to any other enactment or rule of law, which requires
that directors should act in the interests of creditors in some circum-
stances, such as where insolvency has occurred or is likely. In other
words, shareholders will still enjoy priority over claims by creditors,
except in situations of impending insolvency.37 In the event of actual
insolvency, unsecured creditors will rank ahead of shareholders under
the old common law Rule in Houldsworth case,38 which established the
shareholder subordination principle. This rule is now reflected in the
United Kingdom in section 655 of the Companies Act 2006.39
31 However, the adoption of a narrow shareholder wealth maximization approach in the recent Cadbury takeover in the United Kingdom led to considerable employee and
government concerns and call for a review of UK takeover rules.
32 See further M.M. Blair & L.A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, Virginia Law Review 85, no. 2 (1999): 247–328; also see M.M. Blair & L.A. Stout, ‘Director
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board’, Washington University Law Quarterly 79 (2001): 403. Also see M.M. Blair, ‘Ownership and Control: Rethinking
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century’, in Theories of Corporate Governance, ed. T. Clarke (London: Routledge, 2004), 174–188.
33 It should, however, be noted that a parallel (if not identical) perspective on corporate governance can be found in the debate between A.A. Berle and E.M. Dodd; see further E.M.
Dodd, ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’, Harvard Law Review 45 (1932): 1145–1163; A.A. Berle, ‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note?’, Harvard
Law Review 45 (1932): 1365–1372. However, this debate, which followed the Great Depression of 1929, was set in a different context, and it would be wrong to cast Berle as the
ancestor of present-day shareholder primacy advocates or to see Dodd as the procurer of contemporary stakeholder of corporate social responsibility movement; see further W.W.
Bratton & M.L. Wachter, ‘Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and ‘‘The Modern Corporation,’’’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1021273>.
34 See further D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities, Final Recommendations, 26 Nov. 2009, <http://webarchive.natio-
nalarchives.gov.uk/þ/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm>.
35 Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report, Recommendations, September 2011, London, at 35 ff, <http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/>.
36 J. Treanor, ‘Vickers Report: Banks Get until 2019 to Ringfence High Street Operations’, The Guardian 12 Sep. 2011, <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/sep/12/vickers-report-banks-
given-until-2019>; and R. Jenkins, ‘Bank Reform Can’t Wait’, The Guardian, 14 Nov. 2011, <www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/14/bank-reform-cant-wait-until-2019/
print>.
37 See generally, A. Keay, Company Directors’ Responsibilities to Creditors (London: Routledge, 2007).
38 Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 301. See also the more recent statement of law in this area in Soden v. British and Commonwealth Holdings plc [1997] 2 BCLC
501, HL.
39 Similar legislative provisions are to be found in other jurisdictions, such as in s. 536A of the Australian Corporations Act; for a review of this area of law, also see generally
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Shareholder Claims Against Insolvent Companies – Implications of the Sons of Gwalia Decision, Sydney, CAMAC, December 2008,
<www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/0/3DD84175EFBAD69CCA256B6C007FD4E8?opendocument>.
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Section 172(1), therefore, contains a number of elements that
are relevant to the adoption of a more stakeholder oriented
approach by directors. These are most evident in the considerations
that are set out in sub-sections (b) to (d) of the section. The section
potentially applies to a wider range of stakeholders than those
mentioned in the section. Particular attention is given to the
company’s employees, its suppliers and customers, the community
and the environment.
However, there may be other types of stakeholders that should be
considered; this will depend on the particular circumstances of the
company. Creditors are, as we have seen, also recognized, but cur-
iously, they are not listed as a stakeholder in section 172(1). But what
is striking about section 172(1) is that in its first few lines it prior-
itizes the interests of shareholders when it states that, when directors
seek to promote the success of the company, this should be done ‘for
the benefit of the members as a whole’.
In this context, the members of the company are to be under-
stood as its shareholders. However, the term ‘shareholder’ is some-
what misleading, wherein it is assumed that shareholders hold a
share of the assets of the company; the term ‘member’ is probably
more appropriate. Furthermore, companies may not be limited by
shares and so may not issue shares as such.
Agency theory, as developed by economists, has, however, been
dominated by a property rights conception of shareholders. But, in
law, shareholders do have participation rights and do own a share
of the rights to participate in the company, such as the right to vote,
to attend meetings and to participate in the distribution of divi-
dends and in any residue that may exist if the company is
wound up.40
In discharging their duties under section 172, directors are sub-
ject to various constraints. First, they are required to act in ‘good
faith’ when making decisions, and section 172(1)(f) also requires
them to act fairly as between the company’s members. Second,
directors who exercise their role as required by section 172 are also
subject to the reasonable skill, care and diligence requirements
(which apply to the making of decisions) found in section 174 of the
Companies Act. To avoid a charge that directors did not act with
skill or with reasonable care and diligence, they should document
their decisions to show that they did have regard to or consider the
matters set out in this section.
A major difficulty with the duties set out in section 172 is that it is
not possible for any group other that the members or shareholders to
enforce the duty; this was because either the shareholders bring a
derivative action or the company itself sues for the breach.
Employees, for example, do not have standing under the Companies
Act to sue directors for their failure to comply with section 172.
However, section 247 of the Act permits directors to provide for
employees or former employees of the company where the company
ceases business or transfers the whole or a substantial part of its
business. This power can be exercised even if the decision to make a
provision under section 247 will not promote the success of the
company, as required by section 172.41 So employees are given some
further protection.
We have also noted that creditors, as a group, are also subject
to particular protection, as their interests will take priority over
those of shareholders in an insolvency or at least until the com-
pany’s debts have been discharged. This principle is supported
both by common law cases as well as by other legislation, such as in
section 214 of the Insolvency Act, which deals with wrongful
trading by directors.42 Creditors can, of course, seek to strengthen
their position further by the use of pre-packaged arrangements
with debtors or by inserting clauses into loan agreements that
trigger an early resort to the appointment of an insolvency
administrator, such as a liquidator, in the event of the clause being
breached.
Section 172 requires that directors act in good faith and that
they should ‘have regard’ to the interests or purposes set out in the
section. The idea of ‘having regard to’ might be seen as taking
account of various matters and does not mean that the matters
must be given priority; it presumably at least requires serious
consideration to be given to these other interests. It should thus be
noted that there is a distinction between taking account of a
number of interests when making decision and being accountable
to these interests.43 Section 172 clearly falls short of any account-
ability to these other interests. However, this narrow view of
accountability may need to be revised in a world where the major
assets of a company are often the knowledge and skills of its
employees, rather than the capital contributed by a company’s
shareholders. This is especially so in financially oriented compa-
nies such as banks.
In addition to possible action for a breach of the care and
diligence rules, the Companies Act seeks to strengthen the effect of
the stakeholder principles in section 172 by requiring directors to
prepare a ‘business review’ under section 417, which requires that
directors of larger companies must provide an annual report on
the way in which they have sought to conduct the business. As
section 417(2) states, the ‘purpose of the business review is to
inform members of the company and help them assess how the
directors have performed their duty under section 172 (to promote
the success of the company)’. In regard to stock exchange listed or
quoted companies, they also need to set out various key perfor-
mance indicators (as required by section 417(6)) and set out
40 See generally, A. Dignam & J. Lowry, Company Law, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at para. 2.33.
41 Ibid., para. 329.
42 See further, ibid., 329–331.
43 For an expression of such a view, see further J. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), at 36.
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details of how stakeholder concerns have been addressed. Thus,
section 417(5) requires that:
417(5) In the case of a quoted company the business review must,
to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development,
performance or position of the company’s business, include –
(a) The main trends and factors likely to affect the future
development, performance and position of the company’s
business; and
(b) Information about
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the
company’s business on the environment),
(ii) the company’s employees, and
(iii) social and community issues,
including information about any policies of the company in
relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those
policies; and
(c) subject to subsection (11), information about persons with
whom the company has contractual or other arrangements
which are essential to the business of the company.
If the review does not contain arrangements of each
kind mentioned in paragraphs (b)(i), (ii) and (iii) and (c),
it must state which of those kinds of information it does
not contain.
Prior to the enactment of these new provisions, the UK govern-
ment even considered more rigorous disclosure requirements, in the
form of an Operating and Financial Review, but these were dropped
prior to the passage of the 2006 Companies Act.44 However, the
current coalition government has been considering the reintroduc-
tion of more detailed narrative reporting.45
The enactment of the Companies Act 2006 brings to a close a
decade-long debate in the United Kingdom about the desirability
of introducing stronger stakeholder rules into British company
law.46 Reactions to the new legislative provisions have been
mixed, with academic commentators being somewhat sceptical of
their likely effectiveness47 and judicial commentators suggesting
that this restatement does not go much further than earlier
provisions.48
However, the promotion of the best long-term interests of the
company or what has been described as the ‘enlightened shareholder
value’ approach that is reflected in section 172, at least sends an
important signal that it is in the company’s interests for its directors
to consider other interests as well as those of shareholders.49 There
has, for some time, been a statutory requirement that directors
should take into account the interests of employees,50 although
directors were not bound to give priority to the interests of employees
over those of shareholders.51 What is clear from the above discussion
is that there has been a clear public policy movement to recognize
wider stakeholder concerns and to seek to protect them. However, it
is still too early to see how these new legislative provisions will be
applied and developed by British courts. As they stand, these provi-
sions are probably more symbolic than real due to the loose language
in which they are expressed.52
4. EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON GOVERNANCE
OF UK BANKS
A major factor in opening up the legal and policy debate in this area
has been the effect of the global financial crisis. This has seen much
attention being devoted to poor corporate governance practices in
banks and financial institutions, such as from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.53 In a series of UK
reports and inquiries, questions have been asked about the adequacy
of previous methods of dealing with stakeholder concerns. Even
shareholders were found to be relatively weak in seeking that the
controllers of their companies took longer-term views.
This provoked the recent Walker review into fiduciary duties in
banks and financial institutions to call for enhanced of institutional
shareholder activism and recommended the introduction of a Stew-
ardship Code, which has now been developed by the UK Financial
Reporting Council. However, its effectiveness is likely to be ques-
tionable given the costs that shareholder activism entails.54 Moreover,
Walker was critical of efforts to impose wider statutory duties upon
44 See further C.A. Williams & J.M. Conley, ‘Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the UK’, William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review 31 (2007): 317.
45 See further Department for Business Innovation & Skills, ‘The Future of Narrative Reporting: A Consultation’, 2 Aug. 2010, <www.bis.gov.uk/Consultations/the-future-of-
narrative-reporting-a-consultation>.
46 See generally J. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); and J. Parkinson, A. Gamble & G. Kelly (eds),
The Political Economy of the Company (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001).
47 Keay, 2011, and A.R. Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is It Fit for Purpose? (20 Aug. 2010), University of Leeds School of Law, Centre for Business Law and
Practice Working Paper, <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1662411>.
48 In the 2008 decision in Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810, the court compared the new provision of s. 172 with the pre-existing common law and concluded
that they were not very different for the expression of these duties in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch. 304. See also discussion in Dignam & Lowry, 328–329; also see Arden, The
Rt Hon Lady Justice, ‘Companies Act (2006): A New Approach to Directors’ Duties’, Australian Law Journal 81 (2007): 162; and Arden, The Rt Hon Lady Justice, ‘Regulating the
Conduct of Directors’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 10, no. 1 (2010): 1–15.
49 The common law had already been moving in this direction as is evident from the Canadian Supreme Court case of People’s Department Stores v. White [2004] SCR 461.
50 See s. 309 of the 1985 Companies Act (UK).
51 Se further Dignam & Lowry, para. 14.35.
52 This symbolic approach may be compared to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act after the Enron collapse; see further J. O’Brien, ‘The Politics of Symbolism: Sarbanes-
Oxley in Context’, in International Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley, ed. P.U. Ali & G.N. Gregoriou (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 9–25.
53 G. Kirkpatrick, ‘The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’, Financial Market Trends (2009): 1, Paris, OECD, 2009.
54 For a more detailed analysis of this code, see Cheffins, 985; Reisberg, 2011; and Roach.
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directors, which would require them to have regard to stakeholder
interests beyond those of the shareholders. As he observed in his final
report:
The directors’ primary duty to shareholders may on occasion
appear to conflict with the interests of other stakeholders such as
employees in the case of a proposed divestment or an acquisition
that may involve job losses as part of the generation of
synergies.. . .To dilute the primacy of the duty of the
BOFI director to shareholders to accommodate a new account-
ability to other stakeholders would risk changing fundamentally
the contractual and legal basis on which the UK market economy
operates.55
The financial crisis showed how poorly protected many stake-
holder groups in banks were. Not only did many depositors fear that
their savings would be lost (forcing the government to tighten the
depositor protection regime), but shareholders suffered as well. The
shareholders in Northern Rock plc, for example, lost their case
against the government when the failed bank was nationalized and
the subsequent valuation of their shares left them financially
ruined.56 In a wide-ranging review of the causes of the financial crisis
by the Chairman of the UK FSA, Lord Adair Turner pointed to the
failure of market discipline in the quantification of market risks.57
It was recognized that both internal and external protection of
stakeholder interests in British banks was deficient. The House of
Commons inquiry into the failure of Northern Rock bank was
especially critical of the failure of the directors of this bank to control
risk.58 The subsequent Walker review called for wide-ranging
improvements in the performance of bank directors and led ulti-
mately to revisions of the rules now found in the UK Corporate
Governance Code.59
But a key issue arising out of the banking crisis, namely the
remuneration of bank officers and the need for better schemes for
the monitoring and approval of these regimes, has largely remained
unresolved. The UK’s Companies (Summary Financial Statement)
Regulations 2008 provide that a summary financial statement must
be prepared by companies and that this should set out the aggregate
amount of directors’ emoluments. Shareholders who received a
summary financial statement are able to vote on this report.60
Arguably, employees should also be able to be represented on a
company’s remuneration committee, as a recent House of Com-
mons report suggested.61 The Commons Treasury Committee
observed that:
We found that bonus-driven remuneration structures encouraged
reckless and excessive risk-taking and that the design of bonus
schemes was not aligned with the interests of shareholders and the
long-term sustainability of the banks. We express concern that the
Turner Review [by the chairman of the FSA] downplays the role
that remuneration played in causing the banking crisis and ques-
tion whether the Financial Services Authority has attached suffi-
cient priority to tackling remuneration in the City. The banking
crisis has exposed serious flaws and shortcomings in remunera-
tion practices in parts of the banking sector and, in particular,
within investment banking.62
The Treasury Committee concluded that:
Whilst the causes of the present financial crisis are numerous and
diverse, it is clear that bonus-driven remuneration structures
prevalent in the City of London as well as in other financial
centres, especially in investment banking, led to reckless and
excessive risk-taking. In too many cases the design of bonus
schemes in the banking sector were flawed and not aligned with
the interests of shareholders and the long-term sustainability of
the banks.63
Existing remuneration rules provide a limited degree of company
disclosure in regard to remuneration, but there is still much room for
further improvement given the massive rise in executive remunera-
tion in recent years.64 In the meantime, the UK government has been
entering into agreements with leading UK banks in regard to their
remuneration disclosure policies for their highest-paid officers. By
2012, it is proposed to introduce mandatory remuneration disclosure
rules for major banks.65 UK public companies are now required to
55 Walker. See further <www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm>, at 137.
56 For a discussion of this litigation by shareholders, see generally Tomasic, ‘Shareholder Litigation and the Financial Crisis’, 2009, <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1636430>.
57 A. Turner, Lord, The Turner Review – A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London: Financial Services Authority, March 2009), at 44–47.
58 See generally House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock; Fifth Report of Session 2007–08, Volume I, Report, together with Formal Minutes, The House of
Commons, 24 Jan. 2008, <www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf>. Also see Independent Commission on Banking (Vickers
Commission) Interim Report, April 2011, <http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/htcdn/Interim-Report-110411.pdf>.
59 See further Financial Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code, June 2010, at 7, <www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/Corporate_Governance/
UK%20Corp%20Gov%20Code%20June%202010.pdf>.
60 For an excellent summary of these rules and regulations, see further Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, Checklist, Commentary and
Related Best Practice’, 1 Nov. 2010, <www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2010/nov10/29355.pdf>.
61 Treasury Committee, House of Commons, Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the City, Ninth Report of Session 2008–2009, 12 May 2009, at para. 77.
62 Ibid., 3.
63 Ibid., 15.
64 For some critical assessments of this area, see further C. Villiers, ‘Controlling Executive Pay: Institutional Investors or Distributive Justice?’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 10, no.
2 (2010): 309–342; G. Ferrarini, N. Maloney &M-C. Ungureanu, ‘Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies
10, no. 1 (2010): 73–118.
65 H.M. Treasury Press Release 17/11, 9 Feb. 2011, <www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_17_11.htm>.
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prepare remuneration reports and to allow their shareholders to vote
on these reports at annual general meetings, but only in an advisory
capacity. However, this has fallen short of giving shareholders and
other stakeholders an adequate say on remuneration paid to senior
executives. The scheme was criticized by the Commons Treasury
Committee in its report on remuneration when it stated:
The banking crisis has exposed serious flaws and shortcomings in
remuneration practices in parts of the banking sector and, in
particular, within investment banking. Whilst the causes of the
present financial crisis are numerous and diverse, it is clear that
bonus-driven remuneration structures prevalent in the City of
London as well as in other financial centres, especially in invest-
ment banking, led to reckless and excessive risk-taking. In too
many cases the design of bonus schemes in the banking sector
were flawed and not aligned with the interests of shareholders
and the long-term sustainability of the banks.66
The interim report of the recently appointed Vickers review into
UK banks has also been critical of remuneration practices and noted
that:
Weaknesses in the capital and accounting frameworks prior to
the crisis enabled some bank employees to be remunerated on the
basis of reported profits that were neither time-adjusted nor risk-
adjusted and led to employee incentives that were not always
aligned with the long-term interests of the bank. The Financial
Services Authority first introduced its Remuneration Code in
August 2009 to address these issues. A revised Code came into
effect in January 2011 to take account of provisions on remu-
neration contained in the amendments to the Capital Require-
ments Directive.67
The Vickers Commission proposal to separate utility from
investment banking will presumably impose more market discipline
and have an effect on the quality of corporate governance and on the
kinds of risk taking that has occurred in recent times.68 In discussing
one of the causes of the financial crisis, the Turner Review noted in
2009 that:
The very complexity of the mathematics used to measure and
manage risk, moreover, made it increasingly difficult for top
management and boards to assess and exercise judgement over the
risks being taken. Mathematical sophistication ended up not
containing risk, but providing false assurance that other
prima facie indicators of increasing risk (e.g. rapid credit
extension and balance sheet growth) could be safely ignored.69
The global financial crisis has generated a new debate on the state
of corporate governance in UK banks, which is challenging many
established practices and views. However, it is too soon to say whether
it will lead to further advances in our approaches to dealing with
stakeholders in banks. There has clearly been some resistance to this
occurring, but the degree of public anger about the losses suffered by
UK banks, which led to the full or partial government ownership of
many of these institutions, will keep this debate alive for sometime yet.
However, we have at least seen the abandonment of the weak style of
regulation over British banks following the embarrassing performance
of the FSA in the regulation of Northern Rock plc and other banks.70
5. WHY BANKS ARE DIFFERENT
It is often said that banks are special or that they are different. To some
degree this is true because of the damage that big banks can cause to the
wider society and to other participants in the market when they fail.
But, major threats are also posed by other companies, such as those that
operate utilities such as nuclear power generating plants (as we saw in
Japan after the recent tsunami) and oil companies (as we recently saw
with the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico). But, for some reason, the
corporate governance of banks receives much greater attention from
legal scholars and the public than these other kinds of risk.71
In part, this is due to the nature of governance arrangements that
have been developed to protect stakeholders in banks. It is also due to
the inherent instability of markets.72 Following the recent financial
crisis, we have seen the enactment of special resolution rules for the
handling of bank in financial difficulties73; whilst these are to some
extent similar to normal corporate insolvency rules, they are also
different in some important respects. This was evident in the United
Kingdom with the passage of the new Banking Act 2009.74
66 Treasury Committee, House of Commons, Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the City, Ninth Report of Session 2008–2009, 12 May 2009, para. 151.
67 Independent Commission on Banking, Consultation on Reform Options, Interim Report, April 2011, at 178.
68 In the United States, the passage of the Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (which came into effect on 21 Jul. 2010) has also introduced the Volker Rule,
which will seek to deal with the problem of risk-taking by bank by prohibiting them from engaging in proprietary trading on their own account as well as prohibiting banks from
owning or investing in funds such as private equity funds and hedge funds. These rules are proposed to be implemented in July 2012.
69 Turner, 22.
70 R. Tomasic, ‘Beyond ‘‘Light Touch’’ Regulation of British Banks after the Financial Crisis’, in The Future of Financial Regulation, ed. I. MacNeil & J. O’Brien (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2010).
71 See generally, J.R. Macey and M. O’Hara, ‘The Corporate Governance of Banks’, FRBNY Economic Policy Review (April 2003), 91.
72 See further H.P. Minsky, Stabilizing and Unstable Economy (New York: McGraw Hill, 2008).
73 See generally, for a discussion of the special nature of bank facing solvency problems, E.H.G. Hupkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of Western
Europe, the United States and Canada (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).
74 For a discussion of this legislation, see further R. Tomasic, ‘Creating a Template for Banking Insolvency Law Reform after the Collapse of Northern Rock: Part 1’, Insolvency
Intelligence 22, no. 5 (2009): 65–70; ‘Creating a Template for Banking Insolvency Law Reform after the Collapse of Northern Rock: Part 2’, Insolvency Intelligence 22, no. 6 (2009):
81–88.
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Stakeholders in banks have two broad sets of governance and
regulatory mechanisms to protect them. As corporations, banks have
many of the usual board-based corporate governance mechanisms
that apply to other large companies, but these are often weakened in
banks.75 As a result banks are also subject to an unusual amount of
external regulation, at least, when compared to other companies and
need.
However, in itself, this is not enough, and private investors need
to play a greater role in influence governance processes in banks. But
markets themselves have been found to be an inadequate means of
regulating banks. A particular problem faced by banks was the failure
of rating agencies, which served as gatekeepers for investment banks,
and rated securitized assets, which were packaged for sale to inves-
tors. Due to serious conflicts of interests facing these gatekeepers,
they failed to adequately protect stakeholders who relied upon their
ratings.76
As it turned out, both of internal (board and shareholder) and
external (governmental) governance mechanisms failed prior to the
global financial crisis and have been the subject of considerable
reworking. In particular, a more effective system of prudential reg-
ulation has been developed to deal with the risks that can face
financial institutions such as banks. Nevertheless, it is widely recog-
nized that this system of external regulation can be important for the
protection of bank stakeholders.
As Alexander has observed financial regulation can play an
important role in representing stakeholder interests, such as those of
consumers of financial services and depositors in banks.77 As Alex-
ander points out, bank managers are subject to different types of
risks, and so the principal agency problem around which many
corporate governance rules have been built. As he explains:
a major challenge for corporate governance as it relates to banks
and financial institutions involves a redefinition of the principal-
agent problem to include the various types of market failure that
cause financial instability in the banking sector. This means that
banking regulation should be concerned not only with creating
an incentive framework to induce management to achieve the
objectives of the bank owners (e.g. shareholder wealth maximi-
zation), but also to allow the regulator to balance interests of the
various stakeholder group in the economy that are affected by
bank risk-taking and reduce the social costs that are inevitably
associated with poorly regulated banking activity.78
As a result, the UK FSA has developed a series of high-level
principles for the regulation of banks; these principles include prin-
ciples of skill, care and diligence of regulated persons in banks.79 The
2008 Global Financial Crisis has shown that many of the protective
governance mechanism that had been built up within and around
banks were severely tested, and many were found wanting.
The failure to protect bank stakeholders occurred at three levels.
First, it arose within the internal structures of banks (such as with
poorly qualified board of directors and docile institutional share-
holders). This has been well documented in regard to failures at
Northern Rock and in other banks such as RBS. Internal control
mechanisms such as risk assessors also failed as they were effectively
sidelined by the more profitable cost centres that banks depended
upon for their profits; this was most effectively illustrated in HBOS, a
bank which went so far as to remove its risk manager, Paul Moore.80
Moore told a House of Commons committee of inquiry that the
‘balance and separation of powers [in HBOS] was just too far
weighted in favour of the CEO and their executives’.81 This is a
reflection of the fact that, in booming markets, those who seek to urge
caution often find it hard to be heard by controllers who are in the
thrall of more profitable departments in their banks. This may sug-
gest that risk managers should be better protected and better posi-
tioned within corporate organizational structures, if they are to be
effective.
Second, failure to protect stakeholders also arose in so far as
external regulators (such as the UK FSA and the Bank of England)
were concerned. Indeed, the FSA’s own damning internal report on
its regulation of Northern Rock is an illustration of this. But this
regulatory failure also extended to international financial regulatory
bodies.
Third, independent gatekeepers, such as rating agencies and
financial and legal advisers such as auditors and corporate lawyers,
also failed to act as effective constraints upon excessive leverage and
risk taking on the part of banks.82 Given the international nature of
financial markets, banks are also subject to international banking
regulatory mechanisms that broaden even further the range of con-
cerns that boards need to be sensitive to.83
The efforts by the banking sector to protect stakeholder interests
have proved to be less than adequate. However, they have shown how
important a variety of arrangements can be, so long as individual
governance mechanisms do not opt out of their responsibilities in the
belief that other governance and regulatory bodies will fill the gap. A
75 See generally R. Levine, ‘The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence’, September 2004, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No. 3404, <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼625281>.
76 See further J.C. Coffee, ‘What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 9 (2009): 1.
77 See further K. Alexander, ‘Corporate Governance and Banks: The Role of Regulation in Reducing the Principal-Agent Problem’, Journal of Banking Regulation 7 (2006): 17–40.
78 Ibid., 21.
79 For a discussion of these principles and regulatory procedures, see Alexander, 30–33.
80 J. Treanor & S. Bowers, ‘I Was Sacked for Exposing Risks, Says Bank Whistleblower’, The Guardian, 11 Feb. 2009, <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/feb/11/hbos-banking>.
81 Treasury Committee, House of Commons, Banking Crisis: Dealing with the failure of the UK Banks, HC 416, (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2009), at 24–25.
82 See further J. Loughrey.
83 See generally H.M. Schooner & M.W. Taylor, Global Bank Regulation – Principles and Policies (Elsevier, 2010).
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networked approach to corporate governance arguably can be a
valuable approach to protecting stakeholders in complex corporate
settings. Space does not permit a fuller elaboration of this theme
here.84
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has sought to examine some key issues in the UK litera-
ture regarding the protection of stakeholder interests and to link this
especially to banks. It was found that good stakeholder management
was an important means of ensuring the long-term success and
survival of companies.
However, in recent years, short-term policies and incentives have
arguably undermined the achievement of longer-term goals, espe-
cially in banks. The challenge for reformers is to construct a range of
inter-linked corporate regulatory structures that act as a safety net in
times of crisis and are able to deal with stakeholder concerns early
enough to be resolved.
Because bank failure has the potential to cause considerable
damage to a broad range of stakeholders, as well as to the wider
market system, adequate stakeholder management and regulation is
required. This calls for the involvement of a wider range of stake-
holders with internal monitoring and control mechanisms in banks
than has occurred to date in the United Kingdom.
Legal mechanisms are an important means of strengthening a
commitment to stakeholder values, but by themselves, these will not
be enough as a commitment to stakeholder values needs to be part of
the culture of banks.
The frequency of bank failures illustrates their vulnerability and
calls for new thinking about their governance mechanisms in the
United Kingdom. This paper has sought to examine some ideas that
may lead to the development of more effective risk management and
stakeholder protection in UK banks.
84 See generally R. Tomasic & F. Akinbami, ‘Towards a New Corporate Governance after the Global Financial Crisis’, International Company and Commercial Law Review 22, no. 8
(2011): 237–249.
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